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Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective
Contributor(s): Myerson, Roger B. (Author)

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 ISBN: 1288242239     ISBN-13: 9781288242238
Publisher: Bibliogov
OUR PRICE: $14.96  

Binding Type: Paperback - See All Available Formats & Editions
Published: November 2012
Qty:
Additional Information
BISAC Categories:
- History | Military - Nuclear Warfare
- Political Science
Dewey: 355.021
Physical Information: 0.07" H x 7.44" W x 9.69" L (0.18 lbs) 34 pages
 
Descriptions, Reviews, Etc.
Publisher Description:
A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.
 
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